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Delay in Delivery of Cadaver to Next of Kin
Lawrence S. Grean* and Paul Hesse**
M ENTAL SUFFERING CASES are of great concern to today's prac-
ticing attorney. The reason, logically, is that many cases
and situations arise in which mental suffering is a prominent
factor, and therefore deserving of consideration. Whether or not
recovery is granted for mental anguish depends upon questions
of intent, negligence, and presence or absence of physical in-
juries.
The general rule is that mental suffering alone, caused by
mere negligence, is non-compensable.' While a majority of
courts seem to hold that damages may be awarded when physical
injuries result from mental anguish, even though no "impact"
(contact) is involved, in most states the requirement of physical
injury appears steadfast. 2 One notable exception to this rule,
however, can sometimes be found in the law relating to cadavers.
Briefly stated, it holds that mental anguish suffered by the next
of kin, resulting from interference with the body of the deceased,
is sufficient basis for compensation, irrespective of contempo-
raneous physical injury.
Our purpose then is to discuss interference with possession
of a cadaver, delay in delivery, and the accompanying mental
distress of the next of kin.
* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
** BA.., Ohio Wesleyan University; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906); Green v. T. A.
Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md.
61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App.
316, 73 S. 205 (1916); O'Meara v. Russel, 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550 (1916);
Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E. D. Va. 1960); Robb v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 210 A. 2d 709 (Del. 1965); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N. J. 559, 214 A. 2d
12 (1965).
2 Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892);
Sloane v. Southern California Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); Mack
v. South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1898); Kimberly v. How-
land, supra n. 1; Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., supra n. 1; Alabama Fuel
& Iron Co. v. Baladoni, supra n. 1; O'Meara v. Russell, supra n. 1; Laird v.
Natchitoches Oil Mill, Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 S. 692 (1929); Cashin v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934); Orlo v. Connecticut
Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402 (1941); Battalla v. State, 10 N. Y. 2d 237,
219 N. Y. S. 2d 34, 176 N. E. 2d 729 (1961); Kaufman v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 224 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. den. 350 U. S. 947 (1956); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N. W. 2d 345 (1957); Penick v. Mirro, supra n. 1;
Robb v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra n. 1, Falzone v. Busch, supra n. 1.
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Possession
The courts generally recognize that the next of kin have the
right to possession of the deceased-sometimes referred to as a
quasi-property right.3 The line of succession that this possessory
right follows is to husband or wife, surviving children, followed
by parents, brothers and sisters, and then distant relatives. 4
However, in conjunction with this right there is a corresponding
duty. This duty is to dispose of the body without undue delay. 5
A dead body however is a tangible object, potentially
dangerous, which must be disposed of. The party charged
with its disposal has a duty to perform, and in the per-
formance of that duty must be granted certain rights and
privileges.6
Jackson suggests five elements of duty as to those respon-
sible for the disposal of a cadaver.7
(1) The person who has possession of the body holds it
in trust for those who are charged with the duty of burial or
who are privileged to exercise the right to see to burial.
(2) The person charged with the duty of burial or the
person who has the prior privilege thereof, is entitled to the
possession of the body for the purpose of interment.
(3) Such person is entitled to possession in such man-
ner as not to delay, impede, or prevent interment.
(4) Such person is likewise entitled to possession of the
body in the same condition as it was in when death occurred.
3 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891) (willful mutilation of
corpse); Wilson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649, 142 S. W. 775
(1912) (willful mishandling of corpse; cadaver involves a quasi-property
right); Nichols v. Central Vermont R. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 109 A. 905 (1919) (neg-
ligent damage to a cadaver); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21
Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161 (1925) (intentional withholding of death cer-
tificate); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N. E. 2d
360 (1938) (intentional unauthorized autopsy); Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla.
182, 200 So. 541 (1941) (negligent embalming); Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va.
43, 60 S. E. 2d 10 (1950) (intentional misburial; cadaver involves a quasi-
property right); Lott v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 296, 225 N. Y. S. 2d 434 (1962),
(Jewish body to Catholic survivors and Catholic body to Jewish survivors);
Terril v. Harbin, 376 S. W. 2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (unauthorized
autopsy); Parker v. Quinn-McGowan Co., 262 N. C. 560, 38 S. E. 2d 214
(1964) (quasi-property right); also see, Stueve, Mortuary Law 13 (3rd rev.
ed. 1963).
4 Comment, Property in Corpses, 5 St. Louis U. L. J. 280, at 291 (1958).
5 See Comment, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 19
Ohio St. L. J. 455, at 458 (1958) "This is a right to receive possession of the
body immediately and in the same condition it was in at the time of death."
Also see, Lott v. State, supa n. 3, at 436. The court says: "The law is well
settled that the surviving next of kin have a right to the immediate posses-
sion of a decedent's body for preservation and burial ..
6 Stueve, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 11 and 12.
7 Jackson, Law of Cadavers 134, 135 (1937).
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(5) After interment, next of kin are entitled to have the
body remain undisturbed except for proper and authorized
reason.
Although violations of this right of possession may occur in
a variety of ways,S the common denominator is that they all cause
a delay in interment. This delay, in turn, causes grief and men-
tal anguish to those charged with the duty of disposal.
Excessive grief may result because the next of kin are al-
ready grieved about the loss of the deceased. In other areas of
law, damages for mental suffering ordinarily are not allowed be-
cause of the difficulty in determining the degree and genuineness
of the distress. When dealing with the deceased's next of kin,
however, honest mental suffering has been experienced in an
undeniable majority of the cases, subject to only rare exceptions.
What all these cases appear to have in common is an
especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress,
arising from the special circumstances, which serve as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious.'
Remedies
As mentioned above, virtually all the courts agree that the
next of kin have the right to possession of the body of the de-
ceased. 10 There is, however, much disagreement as to when a
remedy will be granted for an interference with this right. The
major points of disagreement revolve around the following con-
cepts:
a. Negligence Not Requiring Physical Injury
When there is ordinary negligence that amounts to inter-
ference with possession of a cadaver, a few jurisdictions allow
recovery for mental suffering alone." The state of New York
8 Supra n. 3.
9 Prosser, Torts 349 (3rd ed. 1964).
10 Op. cit. supra n. 4.
11 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S. W. 433 (1902) (negligent
delay in shipment of a corpse, from afternoon to the next morning); Hale
v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S. W. 605 (1891) (negligent delay in shipment of
body); Parker v. Quinn-McGowan Co., supra n. 3 (the court stated that re-
covery could be had for intentional or negligent mutilation of corpse); note
the line of New York cases that allow recovery in a variety of situations.
Lott v. State, supra n. 3 (hospital negligently mixed up bodies); Torres v.
State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N. Y. S. 2d 1005 (1962) (hospital was negligent in
allowing unauthorized autopsy and unauthorized burial); Gratton v. Bald-
winsville Academy & Central School, 49 Misc. 2d 329, 267 N. Y. S. 2d 552
(1966) (defendant deprived plaintiff of the right to view deceased child
when she arrived at the scene of death); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 49 Misc. 2d
498, 267 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (1966) (defendant wrongfully retained ashes of the
deceased's wife).
Jan., 1967
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has a line of recent decisions covering several types of inter-
ference where recovery has been granted. 12 In Lott v. State,13
and Torres v. State,'14 state hospitals were negligent in handling
of cadavers. In the Torres case, the negligence resulted in an
unauthorized autopsy and unauthorized burial. The court said,
"the state's endeavors herein were insufficient, inadequate, and
ineffective," 15 referring to the hospital's attempt to locate the
next of kin.
In the Lott case, the hospital was negligent in tagging two
cadavers. The result of this mistake was the sending of a Jewish
body to Catholic survivors and a Catholic body to Jewish sur-
vivors. The court made several points relating to interference.' 6
(1) The law is well settled that the surviving next of kin
have a right to the immediate possession of a decedent's
body for preservation and burial, and that damages will be
awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with
that right or improperly deals with decedent's body.
(2) This rule of law has been applied to both physical
mutilation of the bodies . . . as well as in cases where there
was no physical injury to the body, but only unlawful inter-
ference with surviving kins' right to the body...
(3) In decisions affecting this type of action, the courts
are not primarily concerned with the extent of the physical
mishandling or injury to the body per se, but rather how
such improper handling or injury affects feelings and emo-
tions of the surviving kin.
b. Negligence Requiring Physical Injury
Some jurisdictions still require the presence of physical in-
juries, not only in ordinary negligence cases, but also in cases
involving interference with cadavers. 17 The philosophy in or-
12 Lott v. State, supra n. 3; Torres v. State, supra n. 11; Gratton v. Bald.,
supra n. 11; Schmidt v. Schmidt, supra n. 11.
13 Supra n. 3.
14 Supra n. 11.
15 Id. at 1008. See pp. 1006-1008 for the state's efforts to locate the relatives.
16 Supra n. 13 at 436.
17 Nichols v. Central Vermont R. Co., supra n. 3 (negligent injury to body
of a boy; the court held that no recovery should be allowed for mental
suffering without resulting physical injury); Kneass v. Cremation Society
of Washington, 103 Wash. 521, 175 P. 172 (1918) (cremation society negli-
gently lost infant child's ashes; court denied recovery for mental anguish
alone unless physical injury results to complainant); Dunahoo v. Bess,
supra n. 3 (negligent embalming-no recovery for mental anguish not ac-
companied by physical injury); Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 88 Okla. 243,
212 P. 981 (1923) (negligence, causing an accident on the way to a burial,
resulting in mutilation of the body; no recovery for mental pain and
anguish).
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dinary negligence cases, as noted earlier,' 8 of requiring contem-
poraneous physical injury, is carried over to the law of cadavers.
It can only be concluded here, that even in the case of the de-
ceased's next of kin, the courts believe that their claim of mental
suffering can still be falsified. This reasoning, however, has
been subjected to the criticism noted above.19
c. Intentional Interference, Physical Injury Not Required
In situations where there has been intentional, willful, wan-
ton, or malicious interference with possession of a cadaver, the
courts have allowed recovery more readily for mental suffering
alone. 20
As shown before, New York allows recovery for any inter-
ference with possession of a cadaver, negligent or otherwise. In
a 1966 decision, Gratton v. The Baldwinsville Academy and Cen-
tral School,21 the plaintiff's daughter drowned in the swimming
pool of the defendant school. The plaintiff was notified and came
to the school, "and requested permission to see and take pos-
session of her daughter's body." 22 She was denied the right to
view her child for only three or four minutes. The court stated
the following:
Even assuming for purposes of this motion only that the
plaintiff mother was deprived of the right to view her child
for some three or four minutes, brief though the period of
deprivation may have been, while the power to do. so was
in the hands of the school board authorities, in this Court's
opinion, this still would be sufficient for a court to grant dam-
ages for such denial. The cause for emotional upsetness and
disturbance certainly does exist in this state.23
Is Supra n. 2.
19 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 9.
20 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, supra n. 3 (intentional unauthorized au-
topsy; no physical injuries needed where the act is intentional; recovery
for mental suffering alone); Wilson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., supra n. 3
(intentional mishandling of body while in transportation; when the act is
willful, wanton, or intentional, no physical injury is needed; mental suffer-
ing is enough to allow recovery); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla.,
1950) (undertaker kept the body as security for exorbitant fee despite the
request of parents; court said that malice was needed for recovery for
mental suffering; recovery allowed in this case); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133
Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925) (defendant willfully detained body for cre-
mation in order to collect a debt); but, cf., Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1,
81 N. W. 1003 (1900) (intentional interference with funeral; no physical
injury from the mental suffering, so no recovery).
21 Supra n. 11.
22 Id. at 553.
23 Id.
Jan., 1967
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d. Contract Theory
There are some jurisdictions that allow recovery for mental
anguish caused by interference with possession of a cadaver,
when based on breach of contract. Funeral arrangements and
transportation are two of the more common situations where a
contract may be involved. Recovery for mental suffering is
granted on the theory that it is within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract is entered into.24 There are certain
jurisdictions, however, that deny recovery on this theory be-
cause they feel that such mental anguish is not contemplated in
the minds of the contracting parties.25
Ohio
a. When Recovery Is Aowed
Ohio has not taken a progressive approach to situations in-
volving mental suffering. When dealing with negligence, the
general rule in that state is that there is no recovery even for
physical injuries resulting from mental anguish in the absence
of impact or contact.26 If no physical injury has occurred, then
only intentional, malicious, willful, or wanton acts will suffice.
Regarding interference with cadavers, a recovery will be
granted in an action in tort only when the delay is intentional.27
Recovery on a breach of contract theory will not be awarded in
Ohio.28
b. Procedure Upon Death
What is the procedure followed as to disposal of the body
when someone dies? For a better understanding of this im-
portant area of the subject, perhaps a summary of the approach
taken by one state will be worthwhile. Ohio, like many other
states, breaks the subject of procedure into two general classifi-
cations. First, the procedure when a person dies under the care
of a physician. Second, when a person not under a physician's
care dies, whether by suicide, by accident, by violent or crimi-
24 Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P. 2d
181. (1959); So. Relle v. Western Union Tele. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881); Taylor
v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. App. 33 (1915); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hull, supra n. 11;
Sanford v. Ware, supra n. 3; Brown v. Funeral Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn,
226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E.
2d 810 (1949).
25 Dunahoo v. Bess, supra n. 3; Plummer v. Hollis, 213 Ind. 43, 11 N. E. 2d
140 (1937); Grille v. Abele Funeral Home, Inc., 69 Ohio App. 51, 42 N. E. 2d
788 (1940); Beaulieu v. Great Northern R. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N. W. 353
(1907).
26 Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499 (1908).
27 Brownlee v. Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68 N. E. 2d 798 (1946).
28 Grille v. Abele Funeral, supra n. 25.
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nal means, by casualty, or in any unusual or suspicious man-
ner.
29
In the latter situation, Ohio law requires the immediate noti-
fication of the coroner.30 The coroner or deputy coroner then
has not only the right, but also the duty to take possession of
the deceased's body for purposes of determining the probable
cause of death.31 Once he acquires this possession, the coroner is
obliged to notify the deceased's next of kin.3 2 This notification
may be verbal or written, unless the relatives are not known.33
Then, notice and cause of death advertised in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county will suffice.34
The significant factor to be noted here is that, after notifica-
tion, the relatives may not demand immediate possession of the
body for burial purposes. 35 The coroner has the right to detain
the corpse of the deceased for as long as he deems necessary in
determining the probable cause of death.36 If he believes that
an autopsy should be performed, he has the authority, in Ohio,
to proceed without requesting permission from the next of kin
of the deceased. 37 In Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) in Ohio,
approximately eighty percent of all coroner cases are autopsied. 3s
As a result of this statutory power given to the coroner, the
relatives of the deceased have a cause of action limited to cases
where the coroner has deliberately and intentionally withheld
the body, not in pursuance of determining the cause of death.
No such cases have been reported.
The second and more active area regarding liability for de-
lay in delivery concerns the person who passes away with a
physician in attendance. Since the cause of death is known and
certified to by the physician, the deceased's next of kin have
the immediate right to possession.39 An autopsy is authorized
only in cases where death occurred in an unlawful or suspicious
manner.
40
Ohio, however, has diluted the strength of this possessory
right. While the Code announces liability for refusal to deliver
29 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 313.11.
30 Ibid., 313.12; 313.11.
31 Id., 313.21; 313.13.
32 Id., 313.14.
33 Id., 313.14.
34 Id., 313.14.
35 Id., 313.15.
36 Id., 313.15.
37 Id., 313.13.
38 Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office.
39 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1713.34; 1713.35; 1713.39; 1713.41. Liability when
death occurs at charitable institution, city hospital, etc. See, Ohio Rev.
Code, Sec. 1713.39 and supra n. 3 (liability when death occurs at home).
40 1939 Op. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) 727.
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a corpse or for any unlawful possession,4 1 it then grants an im-
munity from liability for 24 hours to charitable institutions, city
hospitals, and other similar institutions. 42 That is, any of the
above institutions can rightfully refuse delivery for 24 hours
after death.43 The result of this statute is that there may be an
actual delay in delivery of the body to the next of kin, but it
may not constitute an actionable delay.
Interviews with several funeral homes disclosed the fact that
while very rarely do any delays fall into the unlawful possession
classification (more than 24 hours), it is not uncommon for hos-
pitals and other institutions of similar nature to take advantage
of the full time allotment under the statute. 44 The common rea-
son for this delay seems to be the attempt to obtain autopsy per-
mission from the next of kin.
45
Thus, Ohio announces its belief in the right of possession in
the next of kin, but goes on to provide safeguards which make
recovery under this right most difficult.
Conclusion
While a few jurisdictions now allow recovery for interference
with possession of cadavers, for mental suffering unaccompanied
by physical injury, the majority do not. The majority appears to
base this conclusion on the possibility of feigning of mental
anguish. This line of reasoning seems not only unreasonable, but
absurd in most cases.
Since genuine mental distress is suffered by most relatives
because of the death of the deceased alone, in all but a minute
percentage of cases it is certainly reasonable to assume that any
delay in delivering the body to the next of kin will result in fur-
ther suffering. Jurisdictions requiring contemporaneous physical
injury protect the defendant against the minuscule minority of
abuses, and also bar the majority who have valid claims de-
serving a remedy. We believe that the inequity is obvious.
41 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1713.39; 1713.41.
42 Id., 1713.41.
43 Id., 1713.41.
44 Names withheld upon request.
45 Ibid.
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